This reply clarifies what G. Gigerenzer's (e.g., 1991, 1994; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987) critique of the heuristics-and-biases approach to statistcial reasoning is and is not about. At issue is the imposition of unnecessarily narrow norms of sound reasoning that are used to diagnose so-called cognitive illusions and the continuing reliance on vague heuristics that explain everything and nothing. D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (1996) incorrectly asserted that Gigerenzer simply claimed that frequency formats make all cognitive illusions disappear. In contrast, Gigerenzer has proposed and tested models that actually predict when frequency judgements are valide and when they are not. The issue is not whether or not, or how often, cognitive illusion disappear. The focus should be rather the construction of detailed models of cognitive processes that explain when and why they disappear. A postscript of responds to Kahneman Tversky's (1996) postscript.
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