Book:
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
Type:
Category:
Volume:
21(10)
Pages:
1083-1092
Year:
1995
Abstract:
A well-substantiated, surprising finding is that people judge the occurence of an event of low probability as less likely when its probability is represented by a ratio of small numbers (e.g., 1 in 20) than of larger (e.g., 10 in 200) numbers. The results of three experiments demonstrated that this phenomenon is broadly general and occurs as readily in pre- as in postoutcome judgments. These results support an interpretation in terms of subjective probability, as suggested by the principles of cognitive-experiential self theory, but not as an interpretation in terms of imagining couter-factual alternatives, as proposed by norm theory.
The CAUSE Research Group is supported in part by a member initiative grant from the American Statistical Association’s Section on Statistics and Data Science Education